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Hudson v. McMillian: The Evolving Standard of Eighth
Amendment Application to the Use of Excessive Force Against

Prison Inmates
More than 823,000 persons currently are imprisoned in the United
States.I Although these men and women serve sentences for crimes ranging from multiple murder to petty theft, they share more than their status as prisoners: They also share the right to be free of cruel and unusual
punishments under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 By virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 3 inmates in state prisons who
have been victimized by incidents of excessive physical force may bring
1. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 1991 1 (1992). There
were 823,414 inmates in federal and state prisons on December 31, 1991. This number is a
record high, and is up from 773,124 the year before. Since 1980, when 329,821 persons were
incarcerated in federal and state prisons, the number has increased 149.7%. Id.
2. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-66 (1974) ("There is no iron curtain drawn between
the Constitution and the prisons of this country.").
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id.
Federal prisoners may seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights directly,
depending upon the type of deprivation alleged. Federal inmates claiming personal injuries as
a result of the negligence of prison officials may sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA). See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 164-66 (1963) (allowing for the first time
prisoners to bring suit under the FTCA). Since 1966, the FrCA has required the exhaustion
of certain administrative procedures prior to the filing of such a suit in federal court. 28
C.F.R. § 543.30-.32 (1992). For deprivations beyond the scope of the FrCA involving the
actions of federal officials, federal prisoners may sue directly under the Constitution by virtue
of the Court's decision in Bivins v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which
found a direct cause of action to obtain a remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment by
federal officials. Id. at 391-97. For a more complete discussion of the enforcement of federal
claims generally, see William A. Fletcher, The DiscretionaryConstitution: InstitutionalRemedies andJudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 664-88 (1982); Barry Friedman, When Rights
EncounterReality: Enforcing FederalRemedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 748-53 (1992); Gene
R. Nichol, Bivins, Chilicky, and ConstitutionalDamages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 111820 (1989). In its October 1991 Term, the Court discussed what circumstances require the
exhaustion of administrative remedies under the FTCA, and the claims to which the FTCA
applies. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 1084-89 (1992) (holding that a federal
prisoner seeking only monetary damages due to the deliberate indifference of federal officials to
his medical condition need not exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in federal
court).
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suit against their aggressors for violations of their constitutional rights.4
The burden of proof an inmate must meet under § 1983 and the Eighth
Amendment has been the subject of varied interpretation because no authoritative judicial test for such complaints previously had been established.5 During its October 1991 term, in Hudson v. McMillian,6 the
United States Supreme Court addressed the question of what elements

must be present to establish a § 1983 cause of action for excessive physical force against prison inmates, and specified what a prisoner must show
to prevail on such a claim.
In an opinion that might have surprised casual Court observers, 7 the
Hudson majority held that the use of excessive physical force against a
prison inmate may constitute cruel and unusual punishment despite the
absence of a serious injury to the prisoner.8 In reaching this holding, the
Court expanded the reach of the Eighth Amendment to any unwarranted
use of force "repugnant to the conscience of mankind," 9 and sent a clear

message that minor injury will no longer deprive a prisoner of a claim

resulting from physical force maliciously and sadistically exerted against
him.

°

The majority refused to read a serious injury requirement into the

4. Prisoners have filed suits alleging deprivations under the substantive Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. Since the Court's announcement in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327
(1986), that no greater protection is afforded to prisoners by the Fourteenth Amendment than
is available under the Eighth Amendment, courts have adjudicated prisoners' § 1983 claims
under the Eighth Amendment. See infra note 81. The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-68
(1962).
5. See infra notes 77-140 and accompanying text.
6. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
7. In light of the Court's narrowing of habeas corpus and its continued endorsement of
the death penalty, see, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3049-50 (1990); Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1722-29 (1990); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426-30 (1985);
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896, 905-06 (1983), it may seem surprising that the Court
decided not to establish a significant injury requirement in excessive force claims. As this Note
explains, however, the Court's adaptation of the Whitley standard to all excessive force claims
imposes a significant burden of proof upon the prisoner. See infra text accompanying notes
154-58.
8. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997-1002; see infra notes 39-58 and accompanying text. In his
concurrence, Justice Blackmun defines "serious" or "significant" injury as that which "requires medical attention or leaves permanent marks"; nowhere else in the opinion is "serious"
defined. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
9. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000. While the Court recognized that not "every malevolent
touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action," id., the Court maintained that
even de minimis injury may result in such a claim where that injury is caused by force "of a
'sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'" Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)).
10. Id. "[T]he core judicial inquiry is that set out in Whitley: whether force was applied
in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause
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Eighth Amendment analysis of an inmate's claims of excessive physical

force; rather it focused on the force used and not the injury suffered,11
relying on "'contemporary standards of decency.'

"12

Conversely, Jus-

tice Thomas, in dissent,13 argued that the extent of a prisoner's injuries

should determine the validity of his excessive physical force claim.' 4 The
dissent would limit the scope of the Eighth Amendment, requiring objec-

tive proof of a significant injury as a prerequisite to a constitutional
deprivation. 5
This Note explains the reasoning of the majority and dissenting

opinions in Hudson. 6 It outlines the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it has been applied to instances of violence and neglect in
the prison environment, 17 and it examines the cases which have most
affected this area of law. The Note then analyzes the Court's decision in
Hudson in light of that precedent.' 8 In contrast to the dissent's characterization of the majority's ruling in Hudson as "beyond all bounds of
history and precedent,"' 9 this Note illustrates the compatibility of the

Court's holding with the prior development of law in this area.2" Finally,
the Note commends the majority's finding that a significant injury need

not be a prerequisite to a claim of unwarranted use of excessive physical
harm." Id. at 999. The Court's adaptation of the Whitley standard to all claims of excessive
force imposed a heightened state-of-mind requirement on claims arising outside of the context
of a prison disturbance. Justices Blackmun and Stevens, in separate concurrences, disagreed
with the adoption of the malicious and sadistic standard and instead preferred an unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain standard, because it lacked such a stringent subjective element.
Id. at 1003-04 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id,
at 1002 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
11. The standard to be used is one that gives "'due regard for differences in the kind of
conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged."' Id. at 1000 (quoting
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)); see infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
12. Hudson, 112 S.Ct. at 1000 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103).
13. Id. at 1004 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined in the dissent.
14. Id (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
15. Id. at 1005-11 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas stated: "In my view, a use of
force that causes only insignificant harm to a prisoner may be immoral, it may be tortious, it
may be criminal, and it may even be remediable under other provisions of the Federal Constitution, but it is not 'cruel and unusual punishment.'" Id. at 1005 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
16. See infra notes 45-75 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 76-140 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 141-68 and accompanying text.
19. Hudson, 112 S.Ct. at 1010 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The dissent repeatedly characterized the Court's opinion as unsupported by precedent: "The Court today goes far beyond our
precedents." Id. at 1005 (Thomas, J.,dissenting). "Given [precedent], one might have assumed that the Court would have little difficulty answering the question presented in this case
by upholding the Fifth Circuit's 'significant injury' requirement." Id. at 1007 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
20. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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force, but concludes that the extension of a heightened state-of-mind requirement continues to burden a prisoner's opportunity to raise such a
claim successfully.2 1
Keith J. Hudson continues to serve time in the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, the maximum security prison where he
(claimed to have) suffered the infliction of excessive physical force at the
hands of prison officials.2 2 Hudson originally filed suit pro se2 3 in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana2 4 seeking compensatory damages under § 198325 for violations of his Eighth
Amendment rights.2 6 He alleged that on October 30, 1983, following an
exchange of words with officers Jack McMillian and Marvin Woods, the
two officers placed Hudson under full restraint, through the use of handcuffs and shackles, and then walked him toward the "administrative
lockdown" area.2 7 During this supervised escort, McMillian punched
Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach while Woods held,
kicked, and punched him repeatedly from behind.28 Officer Arthur
Mezo, who supervised McMillian and Woods and observed the incident,
but did not participate directly in the beating, advised his subordinates
not to "have too much f'.' 2 9 This attack resulted in bruises to Hudson's face and body. Although he sustained no injury requiring immediate medical attention, Hudson suffered a cracked dental plate, loosened
30
teeth, and a split lower lip.
21. See infra notes 156-68 and accompanying text.
22. Hudson, 112 S.Ct. at 997.
23. Hudson continued to act on his own behalf until the Court appointed counsel to represent him on April 29, 1991. Brief of Petitioner at 3 n.1, Hudson (No. 90-6531).
24. The jurisdictional counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988), which
grants to district courts original jurisdiction over claims by individuals seeking damages or
other relief in response to the deprivation of their constitutional rights by officials acting under

color of state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), (4)(1988).
25. For the text of § 1983 see supra note 3.
26. Hudson's original complaint sought $50,000 in compensatory damages and injunctive
relief "'against the officers directly involved to prohibit further cru[el]ty' to petitioner and
other prisoners at Angola." Brief of Petitioner at 3, Hudson (No. 90-6531) (alteration in original) (citing Complaint at 8, Hudson (No. 90-6531)).
27. Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (1990) (per curiam), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 995,
997 (1992).
28. Hudson, 112 S.Ct. at 997.
29. Id.
30. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that Hudson had "appeared at sick call
on October 31 and November 1, 1983, with a dental complaint; his medical record contains no
reference to facial bruises or other injuries." Hudson, 929 F.2d at 1015. The Supreme Court
found that Hudson had in fact suffered minor bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip,
as well as loosened teeth and a cracked dental plate, "rendering it unusable for several
months." Hudson, 112 S.Ct. at 997.
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The parties consented to have their case heard by a magistrate, 3 1

who found that McMillian and Woods had used unnecessary force
against Hudson, while Mezo expressly condoned their actions, and
awarded Hudson $800 in compensatory damages.3 2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 3 Despite its distaste for the use of
unnecessary force in the treatment of prisoners, the court applied an objective test to determine whether Hudson's complaint of excessive force
established a violation under the Eighth Amendment and § 1983.3 4 The
Fifth Circuit's test required that the prisoner prove the following four
elements: (1) a significant injury; (2) the injury resulted directly and
only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; (3) the
excessive force was objectively unreasonable; and (4) the action constituted an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 5 Despite its finding
that Hudson satisfied the latter three criteria of the test,3 6 the court held
that his lack of significant injuries barred his § 1983 claim.3 7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari38 and reversed. 3 9 The Court
acknowledged the traditional standard of" 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' "4 and stated that the satisfaction of this standard "varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation."'"
Throughout its opinion, the Court emphasized the claim-specific nature
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, noting in particular two justifications for this approach: the differences in the kinds of conduct giving rise
to Eighth Amendment claims, and the influence upon the meaning of
31. With consent of the parties, a United States Magistrate "may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case." 28
U.S.C. § 636(c) (1988).
32. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998. The Magistrate dismissed Hudson's claims for injunctive
relief.
33. Hudson, 929 F.2d at 1015.
34. Id. The Fifth Circuit had, at the time of its decision in Hudson, recently enunciated
the standard it would apply to excessive force claims made by prisoners. See Huguet v. Barnett, 900 F.2d 838, 841 (1990). The Fifth Circuit required proof of significant injury to sustain
such a claim. Id.
35. Hudson, 929 F.2d at 1015 (quoting Huguet, 900 F.2d at 841 (" 'If any one of these
elements fails, so too does the plaintiff's claim.' ")).
36. The court found that because no force was required in the Hudson incident, the force
exerted was objectively unreasonable and clearly excessive. Furthermore, the court found
these circumstances to reflect an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Hudson, 929 F.2d
at 1015.
37. Id.
38. 111 S. Ct. 1679 (1991).
39. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002.
40. Id. at 998 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)); see infra notes 85,
114-15 and accompanying text.
41. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
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cruel and unusual punishment by the "'evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.' ")42
Whether an inmate meets the traditional standard usually has involved two types of inquiry by a court: (1) a subjective inquiry, which
questions the state-of-mind or motivation of the officials charged with
infficting force; and (2) an objective inquiry, which asks whether the
force used was sufficiently serious to establish a constitutional violation.4 3
The Court explained that these elements must be evaluated according to
the context from which the claim arose,' without clearly explaining
either inquiry.
Writing for the majority, 45 Justice O'Connor reasoned that contemporary standards of decency are always violated when prison officials use
force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm to a prisoner, regardless
of whether a significant injury results." Justice O'Connor noted that the
use of force against individual prisoners is similar to the application of
force during a prison riot or disturbance; therefore, she concluded, the
same state-of-mind standard should apply to any use of force against
prisoners.4 7 The Court held that whenever force is applied, the determinative inquiry asks whether it "was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause
42. Id. at 1000 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
43. Id. at 999-1001; see Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326-27 (1991).
44. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998. For example, the Court has held that, in the context of
inadequate medical care, the subjective standard is one of "deliberate indifference," and requires that an objectively serious deprivation be shown. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976); see infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. In a prison riot context, however, the
subjective standard requires proof of "malicious and sadistic" intent, without ruling on the
necessity of an objectively serious injury. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986); see infra
notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
45. Justice O'Connor was joined in the majority by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Kennedy, Souter, and by Justice Stevens, who joined in part and also filed a separate
concurrence. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
46. Id. at 1000. The dissent asserted that in this statement, Justice O'Connor eliminated
the objective portion of the Eighth Amendment inquiry involving cases of excessive force. Id.
at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. The Court reviewed its decisions regarding other circumstances giving rise to Eighth
Amendment claims in the prison environment, including the use of excessive force during the
course of a prison riot, see Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320, and the failure of prison officials to
respond to the medical needs of inmates, see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at
998-99. Justice O'Connor noted the similar concerns that arise whenever guards use force to
keep order, including the resulting danger to other prisoners, guards, administrators, and visitors, the need to balance that danger against the importance of maintaining or restoring discipline, and the quick action required of prison officials under such circumstances. Id. Thus,
the Court held all excessive force claims are subject to the standard previously enunciated for
claims arising out of a riot situation. Id. at 999.
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In discussing the role that serious injury plays in establishing excessive force, the Court noted its significance as one of several objective indicators. Other factors to be considered are the need for force, the degree
of force used in proportion to that need, and the perceived threat to the
officer at the time.49 The majority therefore acknowledged the relevance
of a significant injury to the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment
inquiry, but rejected its absence as determinative." The Court noted
that in this case the three other factors all suggested that the force used
against Hudson was excessive, and it reiterated its view that the fourththe injury-is not the only objective factor to be considered.51 Thus,
rather than requiring proof of significant injury in order to establish any
Eighth Amendment violation, 2 the Court chose to focus on the nature of
the particular claim when determining the validity of a prisoner's cause
of action. 3
48. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21). The Court noted that
its expansion of this standard from the riot context to smaller disputes had already occurred at
the appellate court level, citing cases from the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits that had applied the "malicious and sadistic" standard in fact situations not involving
an actual riot. Id.
49. d The Court explained that several other objective factors comprise an Eighth
Amendment analysis, including "the need for application of force, the relationship between
that need and the amount of force used, the threat 'reasonably perceived by the responsible
officials,' and 'any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.'" Id. (quoting
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). The Court did not explain its reliance on these factors; rather,

because of the Court's statement that the requisite intent is often proven by such objective
factors, it is implicit in the Court's opinion that these factors were satisfied by the facts of
Hudson.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The officers argued that the Court's decision in Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321,
2326 (1991), mandated an inquiry into both the state of mind of the officer inflicting the force
(subjective portion), and the harm caused by the incident (objective portion). Justice O'Connor
rejected the argument that each inquiry be made separately in order for an allegation of excessive force to be maintained, noting that Wilson, a case involving the application of the Eighth
Amendment to conditions of confinement, "presented neither an allegation of excessive force
nor any issue relating to what was dubbed the objective component of an Eighth Amendment
claim." Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1001; see also infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text
(describing Justice O'Connor's apparent combination of the objective and subjective components in all excessive force cases by virtue of the "malicious and sadistic" state-of-mind
requirement).
53. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000. The Court found that society accepts deprivations due to
the routine discomfort of prison conditions more readily than it does incidents involving the
use of force, and that contemporary standards of decency are always violated by the malicious
and sadistic use of force against inmates. Id. Hence, while proof of an extreme deprivation is
required to maintain a claim under the Eighth Amendment involving conditions of confinement or a failure to attend to medical needs, the showing of a significant injury is not required
to raise successfully a claim involving a use of force. Id.
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Justice O'Connor supported the Court's contextual interpretation of
the objective portion of the Eighth Amendment test by stressing the importance of the relationship of Eighth Amendment rights to "contemporary standards of decency,"' 54 a synergy that varies according to the type
of deprivation alleged.15 Contrary to the dissent's argument in favor of a
substantial injury requirement,5 6 the majority reasoned that such a requirement would run counter to society's general belief that the malicious and sadistic use of force by prison officials for the purpose of
causing harm constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment, regardless of the injury sustained.57 Justice
O'Connor attacked the dissent's failure to appreciate the differences between claims based on excessive force and claims based on conditions of
confinement or insufficient medical attention: "To deny, as the dissent
does, the difference between punching a prisoner in the face and serving
him unappetizing food is to ignore the 'concepts of dignity, civilized stan'58
dards, humanity, and decency' that animate the Eighth Amendment.
Justices Stevens and Blackmun wrote separate opinions concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment.5 9 Both agreed with the major-

ity's view that a significant injury is not required for an actionable claim
under the Eighth Amendment, but they disagreed with the "malicious
and sadistic" state-of-mind requirement in all claims of excessive force.6"
Justice Stevens proposed that, absent the "special circumstances" 6 1 pres54. Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
55. The Court acknowledged in dictum that, while not every show of force by a prison
official constitutes a constitutional offense, minor injuries are nonetheless actionable where the
use of force involved is either more than de minimis or of the sort "repugnant to the conscience
of mankind." Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). The Court explained,
however, that Hudson's injuries were not de minimis, and thus did not expressly rule on the
issue. The Court concluded that, because Hudson's injuries were characterized by the lower
courts as "minor," the extent of Hudson's injuries provided no basis for the Fifth Circuit's
dismissal of his claim. Although it is unclear whether the Court would have ruled in the
prisoner's favor had Hudson's injuries been characterized as de minimis, the implication is that

it would have. Id.
56. Id. Justice O'Connor explained that society's expectations vary according to the prisoner's complaint: People generally are less concerned with misdiagnoses of medical illnesses
than with unwarranted and excessive threats to personal security. Id. at 1001.
57. Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03). Justice O'Connor defined unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain in all instances of excessive force as inclusive of both the subjective
inquiry of sadistic and malicious intent, and the four factor objective test as previously
described.
58. Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102).
59. Id. at 1002 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
1002-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
60. Id. at 1002 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
61. Id. at 1002 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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ent in a prison disturbance, the subjective measure of "unnecessary and
wanton pain" be defined simply by the meaning of the words "unneces-

sary" and "wanton" themselves, not by the "malicious and sadistic" in-

tent requirement. 62
Justice Blackmun did not discuss in detail an alternate standard, but
63
he voiced two concerns not addressed in Justice O'Connor's opinion.

First, he expressed his belief that the decision not to require significant
64
injury will not open the floodgates to Eighth Amendment litigation.
Secondly, Justice Blackmun explained that the majority's opinion should
not be limited to cases of physical injury, but should apply as well to
claims of psychological harm.65
In dissent, 66 Justice Thomas asserted that the use of force causing
only insignificant harm to a prisoner is not cruel and unusual punishment.67 Justice Thomas stated that historically the Eighth Amendment
did not play a role in regulating the treatment of prisoners; only in the
last two decades has the Court so interpreted it. 68 Therefore, he rea-

soned that the Eighth Amendment should play only a limited role in
62. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens
reasoned that less deference should be given to the intentions of prison officials in smaller
conflicts than should be given in situations involving a full scale prison disturbance. He noted
that varying the standards applicable to the two circumstances would best fulfill the Court's
goal of giving "'due regard for differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth
Amendment objection is lodged.'" Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)).
63. Id at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun noted his
dissent in Whitley and explained that he did not join the majority's extension of Whitley's
malicious and sadistic standard to all allegations of excessive force. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
64. Id. at 1003-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun was
disturbed by the audacity of the Respondents' suggestion that a significant injury requirement
should be upheld because it would help control the number of court filings by prison inmates.
He noted that there exist numerous other constraints to prevent frivolous claims, including the
requirement that prisoners exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in a court of law
under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and the ability of a district court to dismiss, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d), a prisoner's complaint in forma pauperis "if satisfied that the action is frivolous or
malicious." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
65. Id. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the Court was not faced with this issue in Hudson, but noted that he was "unaware
of any precedent of this Court to the effect that psychological pain is not cognizable for constitutional purposes." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). He maintained that to
read a requirement of physical pain into the Eighth Amendment would be "no less pernicious
and without foundation" than the "significant injury" requirement the Court discarded in
Hudson. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
66. Id. at 1004-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1005 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1005-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas cited a series of cases decided
prior to 1963 which declined to apply the Eighth Amendment to prisoners' complaints of
harsh treatment. He seemed to suggest that because the Court waited 185 years to apply the
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regulating prison administration.6 9 Justice Thomas stated his belief that
precedent mandated that both the objective and subjective components of
an Eighth Amendment inquiry be satisfied to establish an actionable violation, and that the objective portion of the test could not be satisfied
without adequate proof of a serious injury.70 Justice Thomas rejected the
majority's contextual approach, and argued that significant injury is required for any actionable claim under the Eighth Amendment, whether
involving excessive force or otherwise. 7

Finally, Justice Thomas characterized the majority's interpretation
of the subjective standard as a compensatory measure heightening the
state-of-mind component to counter the "elimination" of the objective
component.72 He criticized the Court's attempt to distinguish the isolated use of force in Hudson from prior cases involving conditions of
confinement and medical treatment, arguing that "society's standards of
decency [are no] more readily offended when officials, with a culpable
state of mind, subject a prisoner to a deprivation on one discrete occasion
Eighth Amendment to regulate prison administration, its application should not be advanced
beyond the limited role he envisions it should play. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1006 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated that the Court had never before
recognized a violation of the Eighth Amendment in the prison environment absent the existence of an extreme deprivation or a serious injury to the prisoner. He pointed to the Court's
decision in Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991), wherein it specified that "an inmate seeking to establish that a prison deprivation amounts to cruel and unusual punishment always
must satisfy both the 'objective component... (was the deprivation sufficiently serious?)' and
the 'subjective component (did the officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind?)' of
the Eighth Amendment." Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Wilson, I11 S.Ct. at 2324). The majority, however, maintained that the objective component is
composed of other factors beyond the single question of whether a deprivation is "serious
enough" and suggested that often these additional objective factors shed light on whether the
officials acted with the requisite culpable state-of-mind. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
71. Hudson, 112 S.Ct. at 1007-08 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas rejected the
majority's contention that the Court's decision in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986),
supports its contextual approach. "Rather, Whitley stands for the proposition that, assuming
the existence of an objectively serious deprivation, the culpability of an oflicial's state of mind
depends on the context in which he acts." Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas objected to the majority's willingness to push aside the objective inquiry simply because malicious and sadistic intent had been established. "[The state of mind inquiry] is
necessary but not sufficient when a prisoner seeks to show that he has been subjected to cruel

and unusual punishment." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
72. Hudson, 112 S.Ct. at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated that he
was opposed to the majority's expansion of the strict "malicious and sadistic" state-of-mind
requirement to all uses of excessive force and not just to extraordinary cases, such as the prison
riot in Whitley. Justice Thomas noted, "The Court's unwarranted extension of Whitley, I can
only suppose, is driven by the implausibility of saying that minor injuries imposed upon prisoners with anything less than a 'malicious and sadistic' state of mind can amount to 'cruel and
unusual punishment.'" Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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than when they subject him to continuous deprivations over time."7 3
Justice Thomas suggested that labeling the significant injury requirement
as arbitrary provides no reason to reject it in situations involving the use
of force but not in other prison situations, 74 and cautioned that the
Court's decision has "sweeping" implications that extend "the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause beyond all bounds of history and
precedent."7 5
Hudson represents a logical extension of the modem development of

Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.76 Historically, the Supreme Court
had applied the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to temper
sentences disproportionate to their crimes.7 7 Former Chief Justice Warren first emphasized the dynamic nature of the Eighth Amendment in
Trop v. Dulles,78 stating that its very meaning is drawn from "the evolv'79
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Although several lower courts had begun to find that living conditions within prisons constituted a violation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause,80 the Supreme Court did not invoke its protection
73. Id. at 1008-09 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 1009 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas rejected Justice O'Connor's
statement that, were a showing of serious or significant injury required, "the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting
less than some arbitrary quantity of injury." Id. at 1000. He could not reconcile the Court's
rejection of a serious injury requirement with its previous requirement that a prisoner's "serious" medical needs must be violated or that conditions of confinement must fall below "the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Id. at 1009 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1010 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas rejected the view that the Constitution must address all of society's problems, id. (Thomas, J., dissenting), and reasserted his
belief that although Hudson's claim was actionable under state law, id. at 1010 n.5 (Thomas,
J., dissenting), in the absence of a serious injury the complaint did not merit adjudication
under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1011 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated
that the appropriate inquiry was whether state law provided inadequate remedial assistance so
as to constitute a violation of the prisoner's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
76. See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
77. See, eg., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (finding denationalization a cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of military desertion); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S 349, 373 (1910) (finding 15 years hard labor a cruel and unusual pun-

ishment for a conviction of falsifying a public document). For a general discussion of the
history of the Eighth Amendment, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-76 (1976) (Stewart,
Powell & Stevens, JJ., concurring); Anthony F. Grannucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839 (1969); Ronald H. Rosenberg,
ConstitutionalLaw-The Eighth Amendment and PrisonReform, 51 N.C. L. REv. 1539, 154050 (1973).
78. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
79. Id. at 101.
80. E.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338
F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442
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for the prison environment until 1976.1 In Estelle v. Gamble, 2 the
Court first confronted a prisoner's claim that the inadequacy of medical
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). But cf Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd,
393 U.S. 266 (1968) (per curiam) (finding that work camps per se do not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment). For a general discussion of these cases, see Rosenberg, supra note 77, at
1540-50.
81. Prior to its decision in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Court had not
recognized a prisoner's claim under the Eighth Amendment. Instead, the Court was satisfied
with the protection provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
prisoners claiming that excessive physical force had been used against them. This due process
theory was born in 1952, when the Court invalidated the criminal conviction of a man found
guilty of possession of morphine following the use of excessive physical force by the arresting
officers to obtain the drug from him in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The Court
found that the actions of the officers "shock[ed] the conscience" and thus violated the accused's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 172.
In 1973, Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals tackled the excessive
force claim of a pre-trial detainee in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

414 U.S. 1033 (1973). Because the plaintiff had not been convicted of any crime at the time of
the alleged beating, the court held that the attack did not constitute "punishment" within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, rendering the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
inapplicable to the case. Id at 1032.
Judge Friendly, however, refined the "shocks the conscience" test applied by the Court in
Rochin by announcing a four-factor test to be applied when determining whether a claim of
excessive force is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment:
[1] the need for the application of force, [2] the relationship between the need and
the amount of force that was used, [3] the extent of injury inflicted, and [4] whether
force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
Id. at 1033. The Glick court held that, under this test, the plaintiff had established an actionable claim for a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Id
The fourth factor of Judge Friendly's test was formally adopted by the Court in Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), see infra note 119 and accompanying text, as the core judicial
inquiry into an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment. In so doing, the Court
held that in the prison context, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords
no greater protection to the prisoner than does the Eighth Amendment. Whitley, 475 U.S. at
327. Hence, as a practical matter, Whitley eliminated the efficacy of a substantive due process
claim involving the use of excessive force against prison inmates. See, e.g., Colon v. Schneider,
899 F.2d 660, 671 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that macing of prisoner is not cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and denying a basis for prisoner's claim under the
Due Process Clause by virtue of Court's ruling in Whitley that substantive due process affords
no greater protection than the Eighth Amendment); Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 n.5
(6th Cir. 1986) (applying Eighth Amendment to prisoner's excessive force claim and stating
that substantive due process affords him no greater protection).
As this Note focuses on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, any further discussion of excessive force claims under the Due Process Clause, or any other provision, is beyond its scope.
For a general analysis of the law in this area, see, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection
Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive
Due Process?, 16 U. DAYTON L. REv. 313, 343-50 (1991); Kathryn R. Urbonya, Establishinga
Deprivation of a ConstitutionalRight to Personal Security Under Section 1983: The Use of
Unjustified Force by State Officials in Violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 ALB. L. REV. 173, 177-99 (1987).
82. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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attention he received constituted cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. Prisoner J.W. Gamble complained that he had
received inadequate medical care for an injury to his back allegedly sustained while performing prison work. 3 The Court held against the inmate because he could not prove a sufficiently culpable state-of-mind on
the part of the prison officials responsible for treating him. 84 Writing for
the Court, Justice Marshall held that "deliberate indifference" to the "serious" medical needs of a prisoner is the state-of-mind required to prove
the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment." Justice Stevens dissented,8 6 criticizing the majority's reliance upon the intentions of prison officials to determine whether an
Eighth Amendment violation had occurred. He noted also that
"[w]hether the constitutional standard has been violated should turn
upon the character of the punishment rather than the motivation of the
individual who inflicted it." 7 He reasoned that "a denial of medical care
is not a part of the punishment which civilized nations may impose for
crime.

'

88

83. Id. at 98. Plaintiff Gamble alleged that he had not received adequate medical treatment following a back injury sustained on November 9, 1973. Gamble had sought and received care for his pain on several occasions prior to the swearing of his complaint on February
9, 1974, but maintained that he had not been treated correctly. IdL at 99-101.
84. Id. at 107.
85. Id. at 104-05. The Court held that a doctor's failure to respond to a prisoner's serious
medical needs, as well as a guard's interference with a prisoner's access to medical care,
amounts to deliberate indifference to the treatment of a prisoner's serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. "It is only such indifference that can offend 'evolving
standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 105. The Court did not
specify what types of illnesses or injuries might constitute "serious" medical needs, and this
standard remains uncertain today. See, e.g., Michael C. Friedman, Crueland UnusualPunishment in the Provision of Prison Medical Care: Challenging the DeliberateIndifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REv. 921, 946-49 (1992).
In evaluating the point at which official neglect crosses over into cruel and unusual punishment, the Court adopted the general requirement enunciated in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), that an Eighth Amendment claimant prove an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 10203 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173). In Gregg, the Court upheld a Georgia statute requiring that
at least one of ten aggravating circumstances be found before imposition of the death penalty
could occur. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. Estelle extended this standard to incidents occurring
within the prison environment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. This standard continues to form the
basis of the Eighth Amendment inquiry in conditions of confinement claims. See infra notes
125-36 and accompanying text.
86. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 108-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 114 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 106 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Compare Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
669 (1977) ("Prison brutality ... is 'part of the total punishment to which the individual is
being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny.' ") (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 915 (5th Cir. 1976)) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 n. 11(1981) (quoting same), and id. at 347 (deliberate indifference is
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In 1977, the Court clarified the circumstances that constitute "punishment" under the Eighth Amendment. 9 Ingraham v. Wright
presented the Court with the question of whether corporal punishment in
the public schools violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of

the Eighth Amendment.9" The Court found no constitutional violation,
noting that protection against the use of excessive force is available only

to prisoners. 91 In its analysis, however, the Court included prison brutality as a form of punishment giving rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. 92
In Rhodes v. Chapman,93 the Court formally adopted this reasoning

and held that prison conditions also constitute punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 94 In Rhodes, two prisoners held in a
single cell of an overcrowded Ohio maximum security prison brought a
class action suit alleging that the "double-celling" of prisoners under
such circumstances violated the Eighth Amendment.9 5 Writing for the

majority, Justice Powell found that conditions which seriously deprive
inmates of a "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" 96 may be
cruel and unusual under the "contemporary standards of decency" recognized in Estelle.97 The Court held against the prisoners, however, and
"cruel and unusual punishment") with Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 688 & n.4 (White,
J., dissenting) (stating that "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs is clearly not
punishment inflicted for the commission of a crime; it is merely misconduct by a prison
official").
89. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
90. Iai at 653. The plaintiffs, two Florida junior high school students, also alleged a violation of their rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
91. Id. at 664. The Court stated that "[ain examination of the history of the [Eighth]
Amendment and the decisions of this Court... confirms that [the Eighth Amendment] was
designed to protect those convicted of crimes." Id.
While the Court found that corporal punishment in the public schools "implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest," the Court ruled against the plaintiffs on their due process complaint, holding that "traditional common-law remedies are fully adequate to afford
due process." Id. at 672.
92. Id. at 669. While the Court admitted that prisons present the proper environment for
an Eighth Amendment claim, it held that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to public
school disciplinary practices. Id.
93. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). Rhodes marked the first time the Court confronted a disputed
claim that conditions of confinement at a particular prison constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 345. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), the Court upheld the decision of
the lower court, which was undisputed by Arkansas prison administrators, that conditions in
two state prisons violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345 n. 11.
94. The Court found that "[ec]onditions of confinement must not involve the wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime warranting punishment." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

95. Id. at 339-40.
96. Id. at 347.
97. Id.
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stated that the prison's housing of thirty-eight percent more inmates at
the time of trial than its" 'design capacity' "98 failed to establish a constitutional deprivation.9 9 Justice Powell stated in dicta that "contemporary
standards of decency" should be determined primarily by state legislatures rather than the courts."°° He further explained that, to the extent
that prison conditions do not violate such standards, a restrictive and
even "harsh" living environment does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. 10
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment that emphasized the
Court's role in regulating prison administration. 0 2 He noted that in determining the point at which prison conditions pass beyond legitimate
punishment to cruel and unusual, the "touchstone is the effect on the

imprisoned."

'

Justice Blackmun, who joined in Justice Brennan's con-

curring opinion, also wrote separately1 °4 and cautioned against undue
deference by federal judges to state legislators and administrators when
determining contemporary standards of decency.' 0 5 Justices Blackmun
and Marshall dissented and emphasized that the judiciary should also
06
play a role in protecting prisoners' rights.1
98. Id. at 343. This housing situation forced the two prisoners to share a mere 63 square
feet of living space, and the Court accepted studies recommending at least 50-55 square feet of
living space for each individual prisoner sufficient to meet "contemporary standards of decency." Id at 343 n.7. Nonetheless, the Court found this fact, among others, insufficient to
support a constitutional violation. Id. at 348.
99. Id at 348-49.
100. Justice Powell stated,
Courts certainly have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual
confinement... [but in discharging this oversight responsibility, courts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of
the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the
goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system ....
Id. at 352.
101. Id. at 347. Justice Powell found that harsh and restrictive prison conditions are a part
of the penalty criminals must pay for their offenses against society. Id.
102. Id. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined in this
opinion.
103. Id. at 364, 366 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp.
269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977)).
104. Id. at 368 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 369 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[I]ncarceration is not an open door for unconstitutional cruelty or neglect.").
106. Justice Blackmun stressed that there must be a federal forum available to state inmates with legitimate claims that the conditions in which they are confined constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall wrote a dissent expressing the same concerns and disagreeing with the
Court's assessment that the conditions complained of did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall found that the double celing of
prisoners in a 63 square foot cell for a significant period of time to be contrary to contemporary
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In Whitley v. Albers, 1" 7 the Court addressed the issue of whether the
shooting of a prisoner by a prison official during the course of a prison
riot constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Gerald Albers was one
of approximately 200 prisoners confined to cellblock "A" of the Oregon
State Penitentiary on the night of June 27, 1980. That evening, following
the forceful escort of several intoxicated prisoners by two correctional
officials in full view of cellblock "A" detainees, a group of angry inmates,
not including Albers, reacted by attacking the officers and taking one of

them hostage. 10 8 In response, prison security manager Whitley led an
armed riot squad in an attack on cellblock "A."1 ° 9 Shooting erupted and
Albers, caught in the crossfire, suffered severe injury when he was shot in

the leg by a riot squad member. 110
Albers filed suit under § 1983, alleging a violation of his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights due to the squad's use of excessive force,

and also fied pendent state law claims for assault, battery, and negligence. 1 ' The lower courts agreed that all state claims should be dismissed, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district

court's ruling that an Eighth Amendment violation could not be

proven.112
The Supreme Court reversed." 3 Writing for the majority, 1 4 Justice
O'Connor noted the general Eighth Amendment requirement that " 'afstandards of decency and therefore cruel and unusual. Id. at 375 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In
addition, he expressed his disagreement with the "unfortunate" dicta that he felt "may be read
as a warning to federal courts against interference with a State's operation of its prisons." Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
108. Id. at 314-15.
109. Id. at 316. Despite the availability of alternatives, including the use of tear gas, the
prison superintendent, assistant superintendent, and Whitley determined that a squad armed
with shotguns would be necessary in order to protect the life of the hostage and the safety of
those prisoners who were not rioting. Id. The dissent took issue with their decision, noting
testimony that denied that the hostage or any inmate was in danger, particularly when the
guards finally stormed the building, as the cellblock was described as "silent" at that time. Id.
at 331-33 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 317.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 317-18. The district court found that no constitutional violation had occurred
and directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on all claims. Id. at 317. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of all state law claims, but reversed its
verdict under the Eighth Amendment. The court found that Albers raised a valid claim provided that he could prove either "a prison official deliberately shot [him] under circumstances
where the official, with due allowance for the exigency, knew or should have known that it was
unnecessary," or "the emergency plan was adopted or carried out with 'deliberate indifference'
to the right of Albers to be free of cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 318 (quoting Whitley
v. Albers, 743 F.2d 1372, 1375 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)).
113. Id. at 328.
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ter incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain...
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.' "1"5 She explained that the
Court must apply this requirement with an understanding of the different
types of Eighth Amendment claims that may arise." 6 Under a claim of
inadequate medical treatment, the "deliberate indifference" standard was
appropriate.11 7 In a prison riot, however, with the safety of prison inmates and staff at stake, a stricter state-of-mind standard was required.118
Thus, in the context of a prison disturbance, the Court found that
whether the infliction of pain was wanton and unnecessary turned on
"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm."11 9 Because the prison guard was found not to have exhibited the
requisite culpable state-of-mind, no Eighth Amendment violation was
1 20
found.
Justice Marshall dissented,12 1 vehemently opposing the implementation of a legal test which heightened the "unnecessary and wanton" standard in circumstances where the alleged injury occurred during a prison
disturbance.1 2 2 He faulted the majority for basing the inquiry on a judicial interpretation of whether a disturbance ever existed or posed a significant risk to prison security. 123 Justice Marshall maintained that the
correct test for identifying an Eighth Amendment violation occurring
during the course of a prison riot should be whether there was an unnec114. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist joined Justice
O'Connor's opinion.
115. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)).
116. Id at 320. The circumstances from which Eighth Amendment claims arise include a
riot situation or similar prison disturbance, a failure to provide adequate medical care or adequate conditions of confinement, and individual disciplinary actions against inmates. Id.
117. The Court first applied the "deliberate indifference" standard to facts alleging the
inadequate medical treatment of prisoners. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
118. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. Justice O'Connor emphasized the importance of giving deference to prison officials forced to take action in response to a prison uprising in order to
protect the lives of other inmates, staff, and visitors as justification for imposing a higher standard of proof upon the plaintiff. Id. at 321-22.
119. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973), and adopting a test formerly used in the
context of due process challenges); see supra note 81. In addition to adopting the fourth prong
(malicious and sadistic) of the test announced by Judge Friendly in Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033, as
the standard in excessive force complaints arising from circumstances posing danger to others,
Justice O'Connor stressed the importance of the other three Glick factors in deciding whether
the force inflicted was unnecessary and wanton and therefore cruel and unusual.
120. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 326.
121. Id. at 328-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens
joined Justice Marshall in dissent.
122. Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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essary and wanton infliction of pain-period. 124
One year prior to its decision in Hudson, the Court clarified somewhat the relationship of the subjective and objective prongs of the Eighth
Amendment analysis. In Wilson v. Seiter,121 prisoner Wilson alleged that
his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by confinement in an overcrowded facility with poor heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unsanitary restrooms and dining facilities, insufficient locker and storage
space, and excessive noise.126 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Whitley state-of-mind standard of "malicious and sadistic" in127
tent to Wilson's claim and held against the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a prisoner claiming that conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment must show that the responsible officials acted with a
culpable state of mind and, if so, what subjective state-of-mind is required.12 8 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reasoned that a subjective inquiry is implicit in conditions of confinement claims, without
regard to the duration of the disputed conditions. 12 9 He emphasized the
necessity of the subjective element in determining whether an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain has occurred, 3 ' but rejected the Sixth
Circuit's application of the "malicious and sadistic" standard to conditions of confinement claims. 3 Instead, Justice Scalia announced that

the correct standard is that of "deliberate indifference" previously established by the Court in Estelle for analyzing cases involving failure to pro124. Id. at 329-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissenters simply could not accept a
heightened state-of-mind requirement "merely because the judge believe[d] that the injury at
issue was caused during a disturbance that 'pose[d] significant risks to the safety of inmates
and prison staff.'" Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
Furthermore, Justice Marshall charged that the Court did not view the evidence in a light
most favorable to Albers, as it was required to do on review of the district court's granting of a
directed verdict against him. Id. at 330 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall asserted
that had the Court given proper credit to the evidence presented by Albers, it would have
affirmed the reversal of the directed verdict. Id. at 330-33 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
126. Id. at 2323.
127. Id. at 2327-28 (quoting Wilson, 893 F.2d at 867).
128. Id. at 2323.
129. Justice Scalia rejected any standard that would require a culpable state of mind in
claims involving "short-term" or "one-time" prison conditions, but not for "continuing" or
"systematic" conditions of confinement. Id. at 2325.
130. Id. at 2324. The Court noted that although Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981),
was decided upon an objective analysis of the severity of the deprivation, the subjective inquiry
should not be ignored, and is in fact mandated by a claim that any official has inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain. Id.
131. Id. at 2328.
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vide adequate medical care.1 32
The Wilson majority upheld the Sixth Circuit's dismissal of several
of the plaintiff's individual claims, finding that, even if proved, the alle-

gations did not involve the "serious" deprivation required by Rhodes.133
Justice Scalia reasoned that the correct interpretation of the Court's
statement in Rhodes "that conditions of confinement, 'alone or in combi-

nation,' may deprive a prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life's

necessities" 134 requires that the alleged conditions have a "mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable

human need such as food, warmth, or exercise." '35 Because the Court
did not rule on the merits of the lower court's dismissal of the particular
claims, however, it offered little guidance on the factors determinative of
the requisite seriousness of a conditions of confinement claim. The Court

also failed to elucidate what needs other than food, warmth, and exercise,
qualify as "single and identifiable" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment analysis in conditions of confinement claims.1 36

Justice White concurred in the judgment, but disagreed that a prisoner must satisfy a subjective component when complaining of cruel and
unusual conditions of confinement.1 37 Justice White argued that while a
subjective inquiry is helpful to an Eighth Amendment analysis involving

a claim of excessive force, an allegation of cruel and unusual prison conditions should be examined only on the basis of its objective severity,
irrespective of any prison official's intent.' 3 8 He noted that the Court's
132. Id. at 2326-27.
133. Id. at 2327. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Wilson's claims of inadequate cooling, housig with mentally ill inmates, and overcrowding.
134. Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see supra notes 93-106
and accompanying text.
135. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327 ("Nothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can rise to
the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need
exists.").
136. Id.; see also Friedman, supra note 85 (discussing the continued uncertainty following
Wilson of the serious deprivation requirement of the objective test applied in conditions of
confinement claims).
137. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined in this opinion.
138. Citing Estelle and Whitley, Justice White pointed out that the Court's prior imposition
of an intent element to the Eighth Amendment analysis had occurred in cases involving challenges to "specific acts or omissions directed at individual prisoners." Id. at 2330 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment). He reasoned that a state-of-mind requirement "likely will prove
impossible to apply" to conditions of confinement claims which often result from "cumulative
actions and inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a prison, sometimes over a long
period of time." Id. (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice White correctly identified
the difficulty of imposing an intent requirement to claims in which a responsible defendant or
group of defendants possessing the requisite culpability for the entire deprivation is not
identifiable.
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role in such cases is to assess punishment that is " 'formally meted out as
punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge.' ,139 Justice White
feared that imposing a subjective requirement on claims of cruel and unusual conditions of confinement would leave inmates with no alternative
other than to suffer serious deprivations of basic human needs.1 4°
The Court's commitment to a contextual application of the Eighth
Amendment when adjudicating prisoners' claims of deprivations during
confinement has emerged as one of the few constants in an uncertain area
of law. Throughout its decisions, the Court has emphasized the importance of that application in response to "evolving" or "contemporary"
standards of decency."' In so doing, prior to its decision in Hudson, the
Court had established two categories of such claims: complaints arising
out of an inmate's conditions of confinement, and claims alleging the use
of excessive force to quell a prison riot. To each group the Court applied
a different Eighth Amendment test. In Wilson, the Court included inadequate medical treatment under the heading of claims arising out of an
inmate's conditions of confinement and announced that the correct test
to be applied to all such claims is one of "deliberate indifference" on the
part of the accused official, as well as suffering a "serious" deprivation. 4 2
In Whitley, the Court announced that in prison-uprising cases the pris-

oner must show that the official acted with "malicious and sadistic" intent; the necessity of showing serious injury was left unaddressed.1 43
Hudson presented the Court with the new question of whether the
use of excessive physical force against an inmate may violate the Eighth
Amendment when the prisoner does not sustain a serious injury. 4 4 The
majority logically grouped such claims with those arising out of a riot
situation and held that the applicable test for all excessive force claims is
the "malicious and sadistic intent" test.14 5 However, in recognition of its
established distinction between force claims and conditions of confine139. Id. (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting id. at 2325).
140. Id. at 2331 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice White stated, "The ultimate result of today's decision, I fear, is that 'serious deprivations of basic human needs' will
go unredressed due to an unnecessary search for 'deliberate indifference.' "Id. (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
141. See supra note 40; see also supra notes 80-140 (discussing the application of the Eighth
Amendment to inmate complaints). The terms "evolving" and "contemporary" are used interchangeably by the Court.
142. See supra notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
144. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997 (1992). Although the question before the Court was one
concerning the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry, the Court approached this
question as an opportunity to determine the standard of inquiry, objective and subjective, to be
applied in excessive force claims arising out of circumstances other than a prison riot.
145. Id. at 999-1001.
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ment claims, and the different relationship that each category has with
society's "evolving standards of decency," the Court wisely rejected the
serious injury requirement. The Court held that while the presence of a
"serious" injury is one of several objective factors that may determine
whether force was inflicted with "malicious and sadistic" intent, its absence is not determinative of the inmate's claim.' 46
The Court's decision in Hudson logically derives from precedent. In
recognition of its prior implementation of a contextual approach to prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims, the Court upheld the dual classification of such claims, grouped together all excessive force claims, and
announced a single standard of inquiry be applied to them. 147 Contrary
to the dissent's repeated characterization of the majority's opinion as
"beyond all bounds of history and precedent,"' 4 the decision is wholly
justifiable in light of the history of the Court's opinions in this area. Just
as the Wilson Court rejected the Whitley standard for conditions of confinement claims in favor of the less stringent "deliberate indifference"
state-of-mind requirement, the Hudson majority rejected the Wilson approach in favor of Whitley's subjective inquiry. This extension of the
Whitley standard to all claims of excessive force logically maintains the
contextual approach previously taken by the Court in that it classifies all
force claims within the excessive force category, as opposed to grouping
some force claims under the conditions of confinement label or creating a
separate category altogether. As Justice O'Connor explained, "Extending Whitley's application . . . to all allegations of excessive force
works no innovation,"' 4 9 due largely to its use by many appellate courts

in deciding allegations of excessive force outside of a riot situation.
In addition to simplifying the categorical structure of the Eighth
Amendment analysis, the Hudson Court's decision to apply a different
standard of inquiry to claims of force than that examined in conditions of
confinement cases recognizes the traditional contextual approach of analyzing the unique characteristics of each type of claim against society's
"evolving standards of decency." On this point, Justice O'Connor chastised the dissenters for their failure to acknowledge the obvious differences between "punching a prisoner in the face and serving him
unappetizing food." ' As she explained, society is likely to be less con146. Id.at 999.
147. Id. at 998-1001.
148. Id. at 1010 (Thomas, J.,dissenting).
149. Id. at 999 (citing cases from the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
that previously had applied the "malicious and sadistic" standard in fact situations not involving an actual riot).
150. Id. at 1001.
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cerned with denying a prisoner expert medical care for nonserious illnesses or the nonserious deprivation of habitable conditions of
151
confinement because many people live without such protections;
hence, a similar expectation is not present throughout society. 152 There
does exist, however, the expectation that persons, even prisoners, will not
suffer a violation of their personal security as a result of force inflicted
"maliciously and sadistically to cause harm."1" 3 This contextual distinction recognized by the Hudson majority correctly takes into account the
function that prisons fulfill as places of detention, not as playgrounds for
the abuse of authority.
In Hudson, the Court justifiably structured the relationship between
the objective and subjective prongs of the Eighth Amendment analysis
differently from the Wilson Court's approach one year before. Justice
O'Connor recognized that the Whitley state-of-mind test, which requires
no additionalobjective fact to be proven by the prisoner, essentially incorportates the objective component of an Eighth Amendment inquiry
into the subjective component.1 54 Justice Thomas improperly characterized this decision not to retain the serious injury requirement, in addition
to the heightened state-of-mind, as an "elimination" of the objective
component of Eighth Amendment inquiry. 155 While it is true that Justice O'Connor stated that "[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency are
always violated," 15 6 she emphasized the importance of the presence of a
serious injury as one of several objective factors to be considered when
1 57
determining whether the prisoner satisfies that subjective standard.
Under Hudson, the objective test in excessive force claims is not a separate inquiry; rather, the objective component of the Eighth Amendment
151. Id. at 1000.
152. Id.
153. Justice Thomas failed to appreciate this distinction, and instead suggested that society

does not demand that prisoners enjoy "unqualified freedom from force." Id. at 1009 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). The majority, however, clearly did not impose such an "unqualified" standard
of force inflicted, by virtue of the dual "malicious and sadistic" state-of-mind requirement, and
the refusal to acknowledge claims involving either a de minimis show of force or a type of force

"not repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Id. at 1000.
154. Id. at 1001.
155. Id at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas's perception of the standard
applied was further evident in his statement that "[t]he extent to which a prisoner is injured by
the force-indeed, whether he is injured at all-is in the Court's view irrelevant." Id. at 1005
(Thomas, J., dissenting). But see infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
O'Connor's explanation of the relevancy of the extent of injury suffered by a prisoner to the
Eighth Amendment analysis).
156. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.
157. Id. at 999.
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analysis is a part of the subjective inquiry which must be satisfied before
a finding of "malicious and sadistic" intent may be made. 5 ' Because the
sole distinction between the Hudson objective test and the Wilson objective test is the certain dismissal of a Wilson claim that fails to establish a
serious deprivation, the objective test remains very much alive under the
Hudson configuration.
Largely because the issue before the Court specifically involved the
imposition of a significant injury requirement, the Court's discussion of
its decision not to require a serious injury overshadowed its discussion of
the extension of the Whitley state-of-mind requirement. 5 9 Certainly, it is
the significant injury aspect of the ruling that most disturbed Justice
Thomas,1 60 and his preoccupation with the Court's refusal to adopt it
may confuse the reader who lacks a full understanding of the history of
the law in this area.1 61 Despite the dissenters' fears of the majority's
"expansion" of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the requirement that a prisoner prove the heightened standard of malicious and sadistic intent significantly restricts his ability to maintain an Eighth
Amendment claim. Because the requirement must be proved through
objective factors, it is the rare case in which the need for force, the
amount of force used, and the relationship between these two factors
alone will provide the evidence necessary to prove "malicious and sadistic" intent. Merely to measure the amount of force used necessitates that
some injury be inflicted, and not every case will present facts so favorable
to a prisoner's claim as Hudson's complaint: When a man is shackled
and handcuffed, no need exists for using any additional force, because
there does not exist any threat to officials, other prisoners, or prison visitors. Hence, Hudson's imposition of the "malicious and sadistic" intent
standard does not provide for the unbridled expansion of the Eighth
Amendment to prisoners' excessive force claims; rather, the decision provides a remedy for prisoners suffering unwarranted and abusive attacks
which nonetheless failed to inflict a "serious" injury.
Unfortunately, Hudson reflects the somewhat muddied development
of the law it purports to clarify. The decision announces the standard to
be applied in all excessive force cases without providing any guidelines
for how that standard should be applied. However, the Court's rejection
of the serious injury requirement in excessive force claims will limit to a
certain extent the uncertainty with which prisoners' Eighth Amendment
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1001-02.

160. It is the injury issue to which Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion is devoted. Id. at
1004-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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claims are often adjudicated. Adopting the requirement would have left
the Court with two options-defining the term "serious," or not defining
it-both of which would have presented problems for the Court.16 2 A
decision to adopt a serious injury requirement but not define the term
"serious" would have perpetuated the uncert,inty that presently exists in
conditions of confinement cases, leading to inconsistent decisions in later
cases. Similarly, had the Court defined the term "serious," that act
would have granted a prison official the authority to use excessive force
so long as he did not cross some arbitrary line and inflict a significant
injury upon his victim. Prisoners would have no remedy for injuries that
although significant in some way, did not quite rise to -the level of the
Court's definition. There simply is no place for this type of treatment of
human beings in a civilized society.
Despite its wise decision not to adopt a serious injury requirement,
the Court provided little advice on how the malicious and sadistic intent
standard it did impose should be implemented. Nor did the Court enunciate whether the Eighth Amendment may be used to support prisoners'
claims of infliction of psychological pain. 16 As Justice Blackmun stated
in his concurrence, 1" although Hudson did not allege that he suffered
psychological pain due to his attack, "the Court [made] clear that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
'pain,' rather than 'injury.' ,165 Justice Blackmun asserted his belief that
"to read a 'physical pain' or 'physical injury' requirement into the Eighth
foundation than
Amendment would be no less pernicious and without
1 66
the 'significant' injury requirement we reject today."
The importance of Justice Blackmun's point should not be overlooked; certainly, some forms of psychological torture may scar an individual more severely than wounds inflicted by physical force. A failure
to provide prisoners a remedy for psychological torture would sanction
barbaric activity, thwart the intention of the Court's decision in Hudson
by allowing cruel and unusual punishment to be inflicted mentally but
not physically, and quash the rights that all Americans are guaranteed
under the Eighth Amendment. The Court likely will either battle over
whether to include claims of psychological harm under one of the two
existing categories, or create a new standard requiring both malicious
and sadistic intent and a serious mental injury. Because psychological
pain may be proven medically through well-established methods, the
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See supra note 8.
See supra note 65.
Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Court should apply a "malicious and sadistic" intent standard. The current Court, however, might impose a hybrid test, requiring both the
Hudson subjective inquiry and the Wilson objective inquiry to be
satisfied.
Few Americans feel sympathy for prisoners, but sympathy is not the
issue in these cases. At stake is the integrity of the criminal justice system, which provides that persons convicted of wrongdoing pay for their
crimes as ordered by a judge or jury of their peers. While a degree of
discomfort may be expected and warranted in prison, there is no need for
force inflicted for the purpose of causing physical or psychological harm.
Judges or juries determine the punishment an inmate receives, not prison
officials. It is therefore vital that prisoners have means to vindicate violations of their Eighth Amendment rights.
From a Court that supports the death penalty and continues to narrow prisoners' rights to habeas corpus, 67 the refusal to require serious
injury is a significant breakthrough. However, the Court's logical extension of the stringent Whitley standard to encompass all instances of excessive force in the prison environment seriously tempers the impact of
its rejection of the significant injury requirement. Not every guard is so
foolish as to shackle and handcuff his victim prior to his use of force, and

the Court's reliance on objective factors to prove the intent element effectively requires that a serious injury must be shown. Because the Court
gave little guidance as to how these objective factors should be weighed,
courts should place a greater emphasis on factors such as the need for the
force applied, the threat posed to other prisoners, officers, and prison
visitors by the inmate, and the alternatives available to the use of force
when determining whether the official acted with malicious and sadistic
intent.' 6 8 To rely on the significance of the injury injects into the analysis
an arbitrariness that runs counter to the intended purpose of the Eighth
Amendment itself; courts must be careful to approach an inmate's complaints of cruel and unusual punishment as they do any other claimant's.
Similarly, when faced with the question, the Court must recognize claims
of psychological harm under the Eighth Amendment; failing to do so
would sanction an insidious alternative to the infliction of physical force
in prisons.
DIANA

167. See supra note 7.
168. See supra note 49.
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